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Abstract
Recent emotion dysregulation models of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) propose chronic worry in GAD functions as a
maladaptive attempt to regulate anxiety related to uncertain or unpredictable outcomes. Emotion acceptance is an adaptive
emotion regulation strategy increasingly incorporated into newer cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) approaches to GAD to
counter chronic worry. The current study explores the mechanisms of emotion acceptance as an alternate emotion regulation
strategy to worry or emotion suppression using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-one female participants diag-
nosed with GAD followed counterbalanced instructions to regulate responses to personally relevant worry statements by
engaging in either emotion acceptance, worry or emotion suppression. Emotion acceptance resulted in lower ratings of distress
than worry and was associated with increased dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) activation and increased ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC)-amygdala functional connectivity. In contrast, worry showed significantly greater distress ratings
than acceptance or suppression and was associated with increased precuneus, VLPFC, amygdala and hippocampal activation.
Suppression did not significantly differ from acceptance in distress ratings or amygdala recruitment, but resulted in signifi-
cantly greater insula and VLPFC activation and decreased VLPFC-amygdala functional connectivity. Emotion acceptance closely
aligned with activation and connectivity patterns reported in studies of contextual extinction learning and mindful awareness.
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Introduction
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is defined by its hallmark
feature of chronic worry. Newer models of emotion dysregula-
tion in GAD have shifted focus from chronic worry to the
function worry subserves. Specifically, worry is seen as a mal-
adaptive attempt to downregulate anxiety triggered by situ-
ations that are uncertain, unpredictable, or uncontrollable,
which elicit particularly strong negative emotions and anxious
reactions in individuals with GAD (Borkovec et al., 2004; Dugas
et al., 2007). Worry becomes reinforced as feared outcomes
rarely come to fruition, thus providing the illusion that worry
facilitated successful aversion of impending catastrophe
(Borkovec and Roemer, 1995). Thus, worry in GAD is concep-
tualized as a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy that de-
velops in response to anxiety over unpredictable or
uncontrollable outcomes, and becomes reinforced and well-
established over time.
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This newer conceptualization of emotion dysregulation in
GAD has allowed the target of treatment to shift from directly
addressing worries to learning adaptive emotion regulation
skills. Emotion acceptance is one such skill that has been in-
creasingly incorporated into newer cognitive behavioral therapy
(CBT) treatments to counter worry in GAD, with promising re-
sults (Roemer et al., 2008; Barlow et al., 2010). Yet, the mechan-
ism of action of emotion acceptance, and how emotion
acceptance might be related to beneficial outcomes, is not well
understood. A concise definition of emotion acceptance re-
mains somewhat elusive, but broadly speaking emotion accept-
ance refers to the process of observing and allowing emotional
experiences to occur as they unfold in the context of the present
moment, without attempts to control, suppress or alter them in
any way. Whereas emotion regulation through more traditional
CBT strategies such as cognitive reappraisal focuses on replac-
ing worry thoughts with alternate thinking patterns, emotion
regulation with acceptance focuses on allowing the distress
related to uncertainty, unpredictability or uncontrollability to
occur whilst shifting the focus from internal, self-referent pro-
cessing to an awareness of the self in context with the external
world in the present moment.
This is important, as it allows the possibility for new
stimulus-response contingencies to form. For example, using
classical conditioning as a framework, the experience of uncer-
tainty (conditioned stimulus) may become aversive because it is
continuously paired with catastrophic thoughts and images of
future imagined events (unconditioned stimulus). Therefore, as
in classic extinction learning, by shifting the focus from future,
catastrophic awareness to the present moment—a safe context
wherein the forecasted catastrophic event is not actually taking
place—engaging in emotion acceptance may serve to break the
stimulus-response pattern of uncertainty-worry, promoting the
possibility of new learning about the tolerability of uncertainty.
Thus, the mechanism of emotion regulation using emotion ac-
ceptance may mimic extinction learning of contextual sustained
anxiety. In support of this theory, behavioral studies of emotion
regulation using acceptance have found greater initial ratings of
distress during exposure to an anxiety eliciting stimulus relative
to other emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal or sup-
pression, suggesting increased engagement with the stimulus
(exposure). This is followed subsequently by decreased ratings of
distress and greater willingness to re-engage with aversive stim-
uli in the future, suggesting new contingency learning has
occurred (extinction; Campbell-Sills et al., 2006). Therefore, one
mechanism through which emotion acceptance may exert ef-
fects is through exposure and extinction learning.
To help clarify the therapeutic mechanisms of emotion ac-
ceptance, the present study examines the neural correlates of
acceptance as an emotion regulation strategy in GAD.
Investigating the neural correlates of emotion regulation strat-
egies such as acceptance allows for the objective observation of
potential unique and overlapping mechanisms of action, thus
contributing to the clarification of their potential clinical utility.
There have been several fMRI studies of emotion regulation
published over the past decade, which have significantly aided
our understanding of the neural correlates of emotion regula-
tion more generally (Berkman and Lieberman, 2009). Here, we
wished to explore the mechanisms of emotion acceptance as a
therapeutic skill aimed at ameliorating distress and countering
chronic worry in GAD. Therefore, we felt it was important to
understand the mechanisms of emotion acceptance as applied
in the most ecologically valid way possible. As a result, in this
study we chose to examine the use of emotion acceptance in
contrast to the two most commonly used maladaptive emotion
regulation strategies in GAD: worry and emotion suppression.
Like worry, emotion suppression, which is operationalized here
as an attempt to not experience emotions, rather than an at-
tempt not to express emotions (Gross and Levenson, 1997), is an
alternate emotion regulation strategy used by individuals with
GAD to avoid intense emotional experiences (Mennin et al.,
2002). However, suppression has been shown to have ironic ef-
fects: whereas suppression leads to decreased emotion experi-
ences in the moment, it also leads to subsequent heightened
emotion and emotion avoidance (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006),
making this strategy ultimately maladaptive.
Many existing studies of emotion regulation have relied
upon standardized stimuli to provoke emotions, such as images
or generalized worry topics. However, in order to more closely
match the emotion-eliciting experiences of individuals with
GAD, and based upon previous findings of the superiority of
personally relevant stimuli in the elicitation of strong emotions
(Ellard et al., 2012), we chose to use personally relevant worry
statements as the emotional stimuli. We focused our investiga-
tion on regions of interest (ROIs) previously identified in studies
of extinction (Milad et al., 2007; Phelps et al., 2004; Delgado et al.,
2008; Schiller et al, 2008; Lang et al., 2009) and acceptance
(Smoski et al., 2015), but also cognitive reappraisal (Ochsner
et al., 2002, 2004; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Goldin et al., 2008)
and mindfulness (Farb et al., 2007; Herwig et al., 2010; Ives-
Deliperi et al., 2011), in order to clarify the mechanisms of emo-
tion acceptance and potential overlap with other emotion regu-
lation processes. These studies converge on a distributed
network of ventral and dorsal prefrontal cortex (PFC) regions, as
well as posterior parietal, amygdala and hippocampal regions.
By comparison to adaptive emotion regulation strategies, fMRI
studies of worry have shown compensatory activation of the
ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC; Monk et al., 2006; McClure et al., 2007)
and reduced amygdala-VLPFC connectivity in GAD (Monk et al.,
2008; Etkin et al., 2009), as well as increased connectivity between
default mode network structures (dorsomedial PFC; Andreescu
et al., 2014). Studies of emotion suppression have implicated
increased dorsolateral PFC and insula activation during regula-
tion (Goldin et al., 2008). Given the overlap in regions associated
with each of these regulation strategies, we were interested in
whether specific strategies resulted in differential temporal pat-
terns of activation within these regions. We therefore examined
the temporal course of activation across early, middle and late
phases of regulation following procedures used previously in
studies of emotion regulation (Goldin et al., 2008; Ziv et al., 2013).
Materials and methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from the patient waitlist at Boston
University Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders (CARD) and
through the community via online advertisements. Given the
small sample size in the current study, only females were
included to control for sex-related differences in responses to
affectively negative stimuli (Cahill et al., 2001). Participants re-
cruited through the waitlist at CARD were assessed for a current
diagnosis of GAD using the Anxiety Disorders Interview
Schedule for DSM-IV—Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV-L; Di Nardo
et al., 1994) a semi-structured interview designed to establish re-
liable diagnoses of DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association,
2000) anxiety and related mood disorders. Participants recruited
from outside advertisements were phone screened for eligibility
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and for the presence of GAD using the Generalized Anxiety Disorder
Questionnaire 4th Edition (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002) a nine-
item self-report measure, designed for use as an initial screen to
diagnose GAD. Participants eligible at the phone screen level were
scheduled for further in-person diagnostic assessment using the
Mini-ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 1994), a brief version of the ADIS-IV-L
that fully assesses current diagnoses and screens for lifetime diag-
noses (see Supplementary Material for exclusion criteria).
Twenty-four female participants met eligibility require-
ments and were recruited into the study. Of these, two had ex-
cessive head motion during scanning and were subsequently
excluded from data analysis. One participant did not complete
the task in the scanner as instructed and was also not included
in the analysis. Therefore, the final sample included 21 female
participants (age 29.48 6 8.44 years; 85% Caucasian; see
Supplementary Table S1).
Data acquisition
Stimuli. Worry statements used during the scanning session
were generated from participant interviews conducted at the
time of consent using the Catastrophic Interview Technique
(Vasey and Borkovec, 1992). Worry topics were chosen from the
GAD section of the ADIS-IV-L or MINI-ADIS. Topics rated at a 5 or
higher for excessiveness and controllability on a scale of 0 (No
worry/No Difficulty) to 8 (Constantly worried/Extreme difficulty)
were included in the interview. Thirty-six statements were cre-
ated for each participant to be used as stimuli during scanning.
To standardize length of text across all participants, all worry
statements were edited to be between 6 and 8 syllables long, and
were stated as a question beginning with the format ‘What if. . .?’
Statements were programmed for electronic presentation using
E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
Functional MRI procedure. Participants were given typed, detailed
instructions explaining each of the three regulation conditions
(Accept, Worry, Suppress; see Supplementary Materials). To fa-
miliarize participants with the scanner task prior to entering
the scanner, all participants were shown an example of the
computer task using worry statements unrelated to their own
topics of worry. Participants were scanned while viewing the
above described personally relevant worry statements and reg-
ulating their responses to these statements according to pre-
sented regulation instructions over four separate runs
(Figure 1). During each run, participants silently read personally
relevant worry statements, presented one at a time.
Participants were then instructed to regulate their reactions fol-
lowing each of the statement presentations according to three
different regulation instructions: ‘Observe and accept’ (Accept
condition), ‘Don’t think or feel’ (Suppress condition), or ‘Worry
as usual’ (Worry condition). Each run consisted of nine trial
blocks counterbalanced by regulation instruction. Following
each regulation block, participants were asked to rate the ques-
tion "How distressed do you feel right now?" by pushing buttons
on a button box from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Extremely). Trial blocks
were separated by a 15-s fixation cross. Based upon evidence
from previous studies indicating that rapid switching back and
forth between regulation instructions is difficult for participants
to follow (Deveney and Pizzagalli, 2008), presentation of regula-
tion instructions were grouped by regulation conditions, such
that three blocks of each instruction occurred sequentially
(e.g. three trials of ‘Accept’ followed by three trials of ‘Suppress’,
followed by three trials of ‘Worry’). The order of conditions
within runs were randomized and counterbalanced, leaving six
possible sets of condition presentation order (e.g. Accept,
Suppress, Worry; Worry, Accept, Suppress etc.). Condition sets
were then randomized across participants. At the end of the
scanning session, participants completed a brief questionnaire
rating perceived success at following regulation instructions.
fMRI acquisition. MRI data were acquired using a 3.0-T whole-
body scanner (Magnetom TrioTim Syngo; Siemens Medical
Solutions) equipped for echo planar imaging (Siemens Medical
Systems, Iselin, NJ, USA) with a 32-channel head coil. Head
movements were restricted using foam cushions. Following
automated scout and shimming procedures, two high-
resolution 3D MPRAGE sequences [repetition time (TR) ¼
2.53 ms, echo time (TE) ¼ 3.47 ms, flip angle ¼ 90, voxel size ¼
2 sec
What if I lose my 
job?
8 sec Observe and accept
4 sec
How distressed do you 
Time 15 sec feel right now?
1-----2-----3-----4
Not at 
all Extremely
4 sec +
15 sec
Fig. 1. Task sequence.
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1.3  1.0  1.3 mm] were collected for positioning of subsequent
scans. Functional blood oxygenation level dependent signal MRI
images were acquired using T2*-weighted fast gradient EPI se-
quence (31 coronal slices, interleaved, aligned at a 0.68 degree ro-
tation perpendicular to the plane intersecting the anterior and
posterior commissures, 3 mm thickness, skip 1 mm, TE ¼ 30 ms,
TR ¼ 2 s, 90 flip angle, FOV 200 mm, voxel size 2  2  2mm).
fMRI data processing. Prior to analysis, functional data were pro-
cessed using SPM8 software (Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm). Functional MRI images were slice time corrected, re-
aligned and unwarped, and spatially normalized to the standar-
dized space established by the Montreal Neurologic Institute
(MNI) (http://www.bic.mni.mcgill.ca), resampled to 2 mm3 vox-
els and smoothed with a three-dimensional Gaussian kernel of
6-mm width (full width half maximum). Each participant’s data
were inspected for excessive head motion and image distortion
using Artifact Detection Tools (ARTs; Whitfield-Gabrieli, 2009)
Subjects with excessive movement (>2 mm linear movement in
the orthogonal planes; >0.5 radians of angular movement) or
>20% of timepoints with artifacts within these thresholds were
excluded from analysis (n¼ 2). Movement and artifact param-
eters derived from ART were saved and included as regressors
in first-level fixed-effects analyses.
Data analysis
fMRI data analysis. First level fixed-effects analyses were con-
ducted using general linear modeling (GLM) applied to the func-
tional time series, convolved with the canonical hemodynamic
response function and a 128 s high-pass filter. To examine dif-
ferential temporal dynamics associated with the three regula-
tion strategies, neural responses during early (0–5 s), middle
(6–10 s) and late (11–15 s) phases of each 15-s regulation block
were modeled separately, with Statement, Rate and Fixation
blocks entered as regressors of no interest (see Supplementary
Materials). For each subject, fixed effects for these conditions
were estimated at each voxel and statistical parametric maps
(SPMs) were produced for each event. Results of fixed effects
models were visually inspected for errors in alignment or image
distortion.
For group analysis, each subject’s first-level contrast images
(SPM) were entered into a second-level flexible factorial model.
Random-effects GLMs were modeled using fixed-effects SPMs
during each phase of regulation (Early, Middle and Late) and
contrasting each of the regulation conditions with each other
(e.g. Early Phase Accept >Early Phase Worry). To determine the
main effects of regulation conditions during each phase of the
regulation block, loci of significant activation were identified for
each of these linear contrasts within specified a priori ROIs; spe-
cifically, limbic structures (amygdala, hippocampus), regions of
the ventral PFC (VLPFC, vmPFC), regions of the dorsal PFC
(DLPFC, dmPFC), insular cortex, cingulate cortex and precuneus
(see Supplementary Table S2). ROIs were defined and small vol-
ume corrected (SVC) using masks provided by the Anatomical
Automatic Labeling tool in the Wake Forest University PickAtlas
(Tzourio-Mazover et al., 2002; Maldijian et al., 2003, 2004).
Linear contrast analyses were performed on parameter esti-
mates within SVC, a priori ROIs for each modeled event. For the
amygdala ROI, an uncorrected threshold of P ¼ 0.01 was used
with the added requirement that at least 10 contiguous voxels
exceeded this statistical level (i.e. k  10, volume  80 mm3). For
cortical ROI activations, which are easier to detect than
amygdala activations, we employed a more stringent uncor-
rected threshold of P < 0.005. To correct for multiple compari-
sons, an additional Monte Carlo simulation correction was
applied to each t-test result that met the above significance
thresholds using AFNI’s 3dClustSim (Ward, 2002; version May
2015; see Supplementary Materials). Effect sizes were calculated
using Cohen’s d, where d ¼ 0.50 represents a moderate effect,
and d ¼ 0.80 represents a large effect. Only those max voxels
with cluster sizes meeting a corrected probability threshold of P
< 0.05 and a moderate to large effect size were pursued for fur-
ther analysis. Parameter estimates (beta weights) across all con-
trasts (Early, Middle and Late phase) were extracted from the
surviving global maxima voxels (5 mm spherical ROIs) as an
index of blood oxygenation level-dependent signal change using
MarsBaR (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net). These beta weights
were then exported to SPSS (version 18.0) for further analysis.
To ensure differences between regulation conditions in ROI
activations were not attributable to differences in activation of
these ROIs during the preceding Statement blocks (presentation
of worry statements), a series of repeated measures ANOVAs
were conducted on the extracted ROI betas to compare activa-
tion between Accept, Worry and Suppress conditions during the
preceding Statement blocks. Only those ROIs that evidenced no
significant differences in activation between regulation condi-
tions during Statement blocks were followed up for further
analyses.
Generalized psychophysiological interaction analysis. To explore
differences in emotion regulation driven functional connectiv-
ity, a generalized psychophysiological interaction (gPPI) analysis
(Friston et al., 1997; McLaren et al., 2012) was conducted using
SPM8. A deconvolved time course for the amygdala volume of
interest resulting from the second level random effects group
analysis specified earlier was extracted for each participant.
This activity was then regressed against the product of time
course and each condition vector, with the physiological and
psychological variables and ART motion parameters included as
regressors of no interest. The individual subjects results of
these analyses were then used in a random-effects group ana-
lysis using a flexible factorial model, with a statistical threshold
of P < 0.005 uncorrected (see Supplementary Materials for add-
itional methods).
Behavioral data analysis. Analyses of behavioral data were con-
ducted using SPSS (version 18.0). Follow up paired t-tests were
conducted on significant three-way ANOVAs. To determine the
relationship between patterns of activation in ROIs and baseline
worry-related symptom severity as measured by the Penn State
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; (Meyer et al., 1990) and ratings of
distress following regulation blocks, a series of bivariate
Pearson correlations were conducted between parameter esti-
mates of linear activation across each regulation condition and
self-report measures. To determine the relationship between
ROI activation and perceived regulation success in each regula-
tion condition, linear regressions were conducted with ROI acti-
vation parameters as the predictor and self-reported regulation
success as the dependent variable.
Results
Behavioral results
Significant differences in distress ratings following regulation
were found between conditions, F (2, 19) ¼ 17.99, P < 0.001, g2 ¼
1012 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2017, Vol. 12, No. 6
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-abstract/12/6/1009/3574843
by M I T Libraries user
on 07 November 2017
0.65 (Table 1). Follow-up pairwise t-tests revealed significantly
higher ratings of distress in the Worry condition relative to
Accept [t(20) ¼ 5.60, P < 0.001, Cohen’s d ¼ 2.50] and Suppress
[t(20) ¼ 6.01, P < 0.001, Cohen’s d ¼ 2.67]. Ratings between
Accept and Suppress approached significance [t(20) ¼ 1.84, P ¼
0.08, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.82]. We expected high distress ratings to pre-
dict greater success at following instructions to Worry and less
success at following instructions to Suppress or Accept. As pre-
dicted, higher ratings of distress following the Worry condition
significantly predicted higher ratings of success at following in-
structions to Worry [b ¼ 0.63, t(19) ¼ 3.42, P ¼ 0.003] and ex-
plained a significant amount of variance in regulation success
[R2 ¼ 0.39, F(1, 20) ¼ 11.72, P ¼ 0.003] The same was true in the
Suppress condition [b ¼ 0.53, t(19) ¼ 2.67, P ¼ 0.02; R2 ¼ 0.28,
F(1, 20) ¼ 7.12, P ¼ 0.02], also in the expected direction (higher
ratings of distress following Suppress predicted ‘less’ success
following instructions to Suppress). A moderate effect was also
found for the Accept condition in the expected direction, but
this did not reach statistical significance [b ¼ 0.34, t(19) ¼
1.54, P ¼ 0.14; R2 ¼ 0.12, F(1, 20) ¼ 2.36, P ¼ 0.14].
fMRI results
Regulation using Worry. Large effect size (Cohen’s d) differences
were found in early phase responses to the Worry regulation in-
structions relative to Accept regulation instructions in right
VLPFC (BA 47, Figure 2A and B) and left precuneus (BA 31), with
Worry evidencing significantly greater activation than Accept.
Moderate effect size differences following Worry instructions
relative to both Accept and Suppress instructions were found in
early phase right amygdala (Figure 2C and D) and right hippo-
campus, with the Worry condition evidencing significantly
greater activation. In addition, moderate effect size differences
were found following Worry regulation instructions relative to
Accept in early phase left dmPFC (BA 6) and early- and mid-
phase bilateral precuneus (BA 30, BA 31), with the Worry condi-
tion evidencing significantly greater activation. Moderate effect
size differences were found between Worry and Suppress dur-
ing middle phase regulation in right amygdala, right vmPFC (BA
10) and left precuneus (BA 31), with the Worry condition evi-
dencing significantly greater activation (Tables 2 and 3).
Regulation using Acceptance. Moderate effect size differences
were found in responses to Accept regulation instructions rela-
tive to Worry regulation instructions during late-phase regula-
tion in right dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) (BA 32,
Figure 2E and F) and left dmPFC (BA 9), with the Accept condi-
tion evidencing significantly greater activation. Moderate effect
sizes differences in response to Accept relative to Suppress
regulation instructions were found in early- and late-phase bi-
lateral dACC (BA 32, Figure 2E and F) and mid-phase right dACC
(BA 32), with the Accept condition evidencing significantly
greater activation (Tables 2 and 4).
Regulation using Suppression. Large effect size differences were
found in response to Suppress instructions relative to Accept in-
structions during early phase regulation in bilateral anterior insula
(BA 38), left posterior insula (BA 13), and right VLPFC (BA 47,
Figure 2A and B), with the Suppress condition evidencing signifi-
cantly greater activation. Moderate effect size differences between
Suppress and Accept conditions were found during early phase
regulation in midline dmPFC (BA 6), with Suppress evidencing sig-
nificantly greater activation. Moderate effect size differences were
also found in response to Suppress instructions relative to Worry
instructions during early phase regulation in bilateral anterior in-
sula (BA 38) and right VLPFC (BA 47), and during early- and late-
phase regulation in right DLPFC (BA 6/8), with Suppress evidencing
significantly greater activation. Moderate effect size differences
between Suppress and Worry conditions were also found during
mid-phase regulation in right dmPFC (BA 8), with Suppress evi-
dencing significantly greater activation (Tables 3 and 4).
Correlations with behavioral ratings
Correlations with symptom severity. Baseline worry symptom se-
verity (PSWQ scores) showed a strong negative correlation with
mid-phase dACC/dmPFC (BA 32/9) activation and a strong posi-
tive correlation with late-phase vmPFC (BA 10) activation during
the Worry condition (see Supplementary Table S3). A moderate
positive correlation with amygdala activation was also found
during late phase Worry and early phase Suppression, although
this reached trend-wise significance for Worry. No other signifi-
cant correlations with symptom severity were found in any of
the remaining ROI comparisons.
Correlations with distress ratings. Distress ratings following regu-
lation with Accept showed a moderate positive correlation with
late phase VLPFC (BA47) activation during regulation with
Accept. In contrast, a strong negative correlation was found be-
tween mid-phase VLPFC (BA47) activation during regulation
and subsequent distress ratings in the Suppress condition, and
a moderate but trend-wise significant negative correlation was
found between early phase VLPFC (BA44) activation during regu-
lation and subsequent distress ratings in the Worry condition
(Figure 3A, Supplementary Table S3). Following regulation with
Suppress or Worry, distress ratings were strongly positively cor-
related with early phase (Suppress) and mid phase (Worry)
vmPFC (BA 10) activation. Distress ratings were also strongly
negatively correlated with late phase (Worry) anterior insula/
VLPFC (BA 47) activation and moderately positively correlated
with early phase (Suppress) anterior insula (BA 38) activation,
although this reached trend-wise significance for Suppress. No
significant relationships were found following Accept between
distress ratings and vmPFC or anterior insula activations.
Distress ratings following Worry also showed a strong negative
correlation with dACC/dmPFC (BA 32/BA 9) activation, whereas
no significant relationships were found following Accept or
Suppress between distress ratings and dACC or dmPFC activa-
tion. Finally, distress ratings following Worry were moderately
positively correlated with early phase hippocampal activation,
whereas distress ratings following Suppress and Accept moder-
ately negatively correlated with early (Suppress) and mid phase
(Accept) hippocampal activation, but only at trend-wise signifi-
cance for Accept (Supplementary Table S3).
Neural predictors of self-rated regulation success. Early phase right
anterior insula/VLPFC (BA 47) activation during regulation
strongly negatively predicted rated success at regulation
Table 1. Ratings of distress and regulation success
Accept Worry Suppress F(2,19) g2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Distress ratings 2.19 0.53 2.92 0.57 2.03 0.62 17.99*** 0.65
Regulation
success (%)
63.00 18.09 81.50 20.07 66.00 22.10 8.15** 0.30
Note. **P < 0.01. ***P < 0.001.
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following the Accept or Suppress instructions, and anterior in-
sula (BA 38) activation moderately negatively predicated suc-
cess following the Worry instructions, although at trend-wise
significance for the Worry condition (Supplementary Table S4).
Early phase amygdala activation moderately negatively pre-
dicted regulation success using Suppress or Accept but not
Worry, at trend-wise significance for the Accept condition.
Rated success at regulation using Accept was also moderately
negatively predicted by late hippocampus activation. No rela-
tionship between hippocampus activation and regulation suc-
cess was found in the Suppress or Worry conditions.
Cortical functional connectivity with amygdala. Generalized PPI
analyses were conducted using the amygdala ROI identified
above as displaying significantly greater activation during worry
as the seed ROI (x ¼ 26, y ¼ 2, z ¼ –14). Results of this analysis
showed responses to the Accept instruction resulted in signifi-
cantly greater amygdala-right VLPFC connectivity relative to
Worry (BA 44: t ¼ 2.67, P ¼ 0.004 uncorrected, d ¼ 0.70) or
Suppress (BA 47: t ¼ 2.92, P ¼ 0.002 uncorrected, d ¼ 0.76)
(Figure 3B). Accept was also associated with greater amygdala-
left dmPFC (BA 8) functional connectivity relative to Worry
(t ¼ 2.57; P ¼ 0.006 uncorrected, d ¼ 0.67; see Supplementary
Fig. 2. Differences in peak activation and temporal course of activation by condition. (A) Early phase VLPFC activation in response to Worry or Suppress regulation in-
structions relative to Accept regulation instructions. (B) Temporal course of VLPFC activation (Suppress > Accept: x¼ 52, y¼14, z¼2) across early (0–5 s), mid (6–10 s)
and late (11–15 s) phases of regulation by condition. (C) Early phase amygdala activation in response to Worry regulation instructions relative to Accept or Suppress
regulation instructions and (D) temporal course of amygdala activation (Worry > Accept: x¼26, y¼30, z¼12) across early (0–5 s), mid (6–10 s) and late (11–15 s) phases
of regulation by condition. (E) dACC activation in response to Accept regulation instructions relative to Worry (late-phase) or Suppress (early phase) regulation instruc-
tions and (F) temporal course of dACC activation (Accept >Worry: x¼14, y¼26, z¼34) across early (0–5 s), mid (6–10 s), and late (11–15 s) phases of regulation by condi-
tion. Whole brain results for VLPFC (2A) and dACC (2C) displayed at P < 0.005 uncorrected. Whole brain results for amygdala (2B) displayed at P < 0.01 uncorrected.
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Table 2. Worry vs Emotion Acceptance—early, middle and late-phase regulation
MNI coordinatesa
Region BA x y z Vol (mm3) t-score P (uncorrected) b Cohen’s d
Worry > Accept
Early
R. Amygdala 26 2 14 216 2.90 0.002** 0.63
R. Hippocampus 32 12 16 1792 3.39 <0.001** 0.74
R. VLPFC 47 26 30 12 760 3.99 <0.001** 0.87
L. dmPFC 6 4 10 50 1248 2.43 <0.001** 0.53
L. Precuneus 30 6 56 8 5456 4.19 <0.001** 0.91
R. Precuneus 30 6 52 12 3.24 0.001** 0.71
L. Precuneus 31 2 64 26 2.79 0.003** 0.61
Middle
L. Precuneus 31 4 62 28 5024 2.97 0.002** 0.65
R. Precuneus 30 10 54 18 2.69 0.004** 0.59
L. Precuneus 30 8 56 8 2.61 0.005** 0.57
Late None
Accept >Worry
Early and Middle None
Late
R. dACC 32 14 26 34 3240 2.83 0.002** 0.62
L. dmPFC 9 12 40 26 1320 2.60 0.005** 0.57
Note. aMNI coordinates; x indicates right (þ) or left (); y indications anterior (þ) or posterior (); z indicates superior to the anterior commissure. MNI, Montreal
Neurologic Institute.
bResults show significant voxels surviving corrections for multiple comparisons using AFNI 3dClustSim Monte Carlo Simulations.
**denotes AFNI 3dClustSim corrected P < 0.01.
Table 3. Worry vs Suppression—early, middle and late-phase regulation
MNI Coordinatesa
Region BA x y z Vol (mm3) t-score P (uncorrected)b Cohen’s d
Worry > Suppress
Early
R. Amygdala 30 8 12 144 2.42 0.008** 0.53
R. Hippocampus 36 36 6 1608 3.06 0.001** 0.67
Middle
R. Amygdala 28 2 14 104 2.11 0.01** 0.46
vmPFC 10 0 56 4 464 3.09 0.001** 0.67
Precuneus 31 6 62 30 5968 3.58 <0.001** 0.78
Late None
Suppress >Worry
Early
R. anterior insula 13 38 18 8 944 2.70 0.004** 0.59
L. anterior insula 38 40 6 14 1000 2.70 0.004** 0.59
R. VLPFC 44 58 16 10 3424 2.92 0.002** 0.64
R. DLPFC 8 44 8 40 816 2.51 0.005** 0.55
Middle
R. dmPFC 8 8 28 44 728 2.94 0.002* 0.64
Late
R. DLPFC 6 22 10 50 1328 2.58 0.005** 0.56
Note. aMNI coordinates; x indicates right (þ) or left (); y indications anterior (þ) or posterior (); z indicates superior to the anterior commissure. MNI, Montreal
Neurologic Institute.
bResults show significant voxels surviving corrections for multiple comparisons using AFNI 3dClustSim Monte Carlo Simulations.
**denotes AFNI 3dClustSim corrected P < 0.01.
*Denotes AFNI 3dClustSim corrected P < 0.05.
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Table 4. Suppression vs Emotion Acceptance—early, middle and late-phase regulation
MNI Coordinatesa
Region BA x y z Vol (mm3) t-score P (uncorrected)b Cohen’s d
Suppress > Accept
Early
L. posterior insula 13 40 14 4 2176 4.65 <0.001** 1.01
R. anterior insula 38 42 8 14 9480 4.21 <0.001** 0.92
L. anterior insula 38 40 4 14 176 4.27 <0.001** 0.93
R. VLPFC 47 52 14 2 6464 4.06 <0.001** 0.89
dmPFC 6 0 6 48 840 2.73 0.003* 0.60
Middle None
Late
R. VLPFC 47 26 30 12 6112 2.68 <0.001** 0.58
Accept > Suppress
Early
R. dACC 32 16 32 18 328 2.64 0.004* 0.58
L. dACC 32 14 38 0 480 3.03 0.001* 0.66
Middle
R. dACC 32 14 42 28 264 2.57 0.004* 0.56
Late
R. dACC 32 16 8 28 1272 2.57 0.005** 0.56
L. dACC 32 18 9 30 576 2.62 0.005** 0.57
Note. aMNI coordinates; x indicates right (þ) or left (); y indications anterior (þ) or posterior (); z indicates superior to the anterior commissure. MNI, Montreal
Neurologic Institute.
bResults show significant voxels surviving corrections for multiple comparisons using AFNI 3dClustSim Monte Carlo Simulations.
**Denotes AFNI 3dClustSim corrected P < 0.01.
*denotes AFNI 3dClustSim corrected P < 0.05.
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Fig. 3. (A) Correlations between VLPFC activation and behavioral ratings of distress by regulation condition. BA 47: x¼52, y¼ 10, z¼2; BA 44: x¼58, y¼16, z¼ 10. (B)
Right amygdala—right VLPFC functional connectivity (gPPI) during regulation using emotion acceptance relative to worry or emotion suppression. Amygdala seed re-
gion: x¼26, y¼2, z ¼ –14. Whole brain results displayed at P < 0.005.
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Figure S1). None of the Worry > Accept or Worry > Suppress
contrasts were significant at the P < 0.005 threshold.
Discussion
In this study, we sought to clarify the therapeutic mechanisms
of emotion acceptance as an adaptive, alternate emotion regu-
lation strategy to worry or emotion suppression in patients with
GAD. In an attempt to understand potential therapeutic mech-
anisms of emotion acceptance in the most ecologically valid
way possible, we examined patterns of neural activation associ-
ated with the use of these regulation strategies in response to
individualized, personally relevant worry statements. In add-
ition, to better understand the temporal dynamics of each regu-
lation strategy, we examined differential patterns of activation
during early, middle and late phases of regulation for all three
strategies.
Regulation using emotion acceptance was associated with
significantly lower ratings of distress in response to worry state-
ments than allowing oneself to worry, and was characterized by
significantly less early phase VLPFC recruitment relative to ei-
ther worry or emotion suppression, yielding large effect sizes.
Additionally, emotion acceptance was associated with signifi-
cantly decreased early phase amygdala and hippocampal acti-
vation relative to worry, yielding moderate effect sizes. Thus,
regulation using emotion acceptance resulted in both a
dampening down of early limbic and salience-related responses
and less recruitment of the VLPFC, a region previously identified
as hyperactivated in response to negative emotional stimuli in
patients with GAD (Monk et al., 2006; Blair et al., 2008).
Additionally, regulation with emotion acceptance resulted in
significantly greater late phase dACC and dmPFC (BA9) recruit-
ment than worry and greater early and late bilateral dACC re-
cruitment relative to suppression, yielding moderate effect
sizes. The dACC is a region previously identified as important
for both extinction learning (Lang et al., 2009; Maier et al., 2012)
and emotion regulation through cognitive reappraisal (Ochsner
et al., 2002, 2004), and a region previously shown to be hypoacti-
vated during emotion regulation in GAD (Blair et al., 2012). Thus,
in this study, regulation using emotion acceptance resulted in
significantly less limbic activation early on in the regulation
phase, and sustained recruitment of regulatory cortical regions
throughout later phases of regulation.
In contrast, worry was associated with higher ratings of dis-
tress and significantly greater early engagement of precuneus
relative to both emotion acceptance and suppression yielding
large effect sizes, and greater dmPFC (in BA 6/8) activation rela-
tive to acceptance and vmPFC activation relative to suppression
yielding moderate effect sizes, all regions associated with the
default mode network. Further, activation of vmPFC regions
during worry was strongly positively associated with subse-
quent ratings of emotional distress. Whereas less is known
about the association between worry and default mode network
activation, greater recruitment of default network has been
associated with increased rumination in depression, suggesting
a role for this network in negative self-referent processing
(Hamilton et al., 2011; Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012).
Additionally, worry was associated with significant moderate
increases in early phase amygdala and hippocampal activation
relative to either acceptance or suppression, and early phase
hippocampal activation during worry showed a strong positive
correlation to subsequent distress ratings. Thus, worry recruited
regions implicated in both negative self-referent processing and
the processing of contextual fear early on in the regulation
phase, and was the least successful strategy for regulating lim-
bic responses to worry statements and subsequent distress.
Emotion suppression resulted in the lowest ratings of dis-
tress and successfully downregulated amygdala activation early
in the regulation phase to a similar extent as emotion accept-
ance; however, suppression recruited different circuitry relative
to acceptance to achieve these results. Notably, whereas the ex-
plicit regulation instructions for suppression were ‘don’t think
and feel’, emotion suppression ironically strongly recruited re-
gions implicated in both interoceptive awareness and the vis-
ceral experience of emotion (i.e. ‘feel’), and regions implicated
in cognitive processing and control (i.e. ‘think’). Specifically,
emotion suppression recruited significantly greater early phase
anterior insula and right VLPFC (BA 47) activation relative to
both worry and acceptance, yielding large effect sizes relative to
acceptance and moderate effect sizes relative to worry. The an-
terior insula is associated with the integration of interoception
and cognition (Menon and Uddin, 2010), and the right anterior
Accept > Worry
Peak Voxel: x=42, y=18, z=12 (BA 44)
t = 2.92, p = .002  (uncorrected)
t-score
Accept > Suppress
Peak Voxel: x=44, y=24, z=-10 (BA 47)
t = 2.67, p = .004  (uncorrected)
t-score
B
Fig. 3. Continued
K. K. Ellard et al. | 1017
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-abstract/12/6/1009/3574843
by M I T Libraries user
on 07 November 2017
VLPFC with reflexive reorienting and response inhibition (Levy
and Wagner, 2011). Together, the VLPFC-anterior insula have
been shown to form a fronto-insular functional node implicated
in switching between salience and executive control networks
(Goulden et al., 2014; Sridharan et al., 2008). Relating these func-
tional roles to the findings here, these data suggest emotion
suppression is associated with both greater interoceptive pro-
cessing of and orienting away from salience during early phases
of regulation. Orienting away interferes with further processing
of stimulus-response associations and precludes the formation
of new stimulus-response contingencies, in line with accounts
that emotion suppression leads to continued disengagement
from (or avoidance of) aversive stimuli (Campbell-Sills et al.,
2006). Thus, whereas emotion suppression is effective at reduc-
ing subjective distress, it may ultimately serve as a maladaptive
strategy through the perpetuation of avoidance.
Greater activation of the VLPFC was associated with ‘lesser’
distress following worry or suppression, yielding moderate to
large effect sizes, but greater distress following regulation with
emotion acceptance, yielding a moderate effect size. In add-
ition, moderately greater amygdala-right VLPFC functional con-
nectivity was found in emotion acceptance relative to both
worry and emotion suppression. The association between
VLPFC activation and distress ratings in worry and emotion sup-
pression are consistent with the role of the VLPFC in reflexive
reorienting discussed earlier and with existing studies of GAD,
in which VLPFC recruitment may represent maladaptive or
compensatory activation necessary to regulate worry-related
anxiety (Monk et al., 2008; Etkin et al., 2009). However, the
increased functional VLPFC-amygdala connectivity in emotion
acceptance is in contrast to reduced VLPFC-amygdala connect-
ivity found in GAD more generally (Monk et al., 2008; Etkin et al.,
2009). This suggests emotion acceptance may better serve to
overcome existing deficits in correlated VLPFC-amygdala activa-
tion during emotion regulation than emotion suppression or
worry. Additionally, in light of non-significant differences in
amygdala activation between emotion acceptance and suppres-
sion, these results suggest differential mechanisms through
which cortical structures including the VLPFC are recruited to
attain similar limbic regulatory goals, with ultimately differen-
tial behavioral outcomes, such as continued disengagement
from aversive stimuli following suppression vs greater willing-
ness to re-engage with aversive stimuli following acceptance
(Campbell-Sills et al., 2006).
The extent to which the dACC was recruited during worry
was significantly related to baseline worry symptom severity
yielding a large effect size, such that greater severity was associ-
ated with less recruitment of this region. In addition, dACC was
significantly more activated during late phase regulation with
emotion acceptance than either worry or suppression, although
with moderate effect sizes, and was strongly negatively corre-
lated with distress ratings following worry. This suggests a po-
tential key role for dACC in the adaptive regulation of worry-
related anxiety in GAD, and a potential mechanism through
which emotion acceptance, as a therapeutic strategy, may be
helpful.
This finding is intriguing in light of a recent meta-analysis
investigating structural and functional abnormalities across
psychopathology (Goodkind et al., 2015). Using data from nearly
200 studies and over 7000 individuals with a range of diagnoses
including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, obsessive
compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety and addiction, con-
verging grey matter loss was found across all diagnoses in the
dACC and bilateral anterior insula. This suggests deficits in
adaptive recruitment of dACC and anterior insula may repre-
sent specific transdiagnostic biomarkers of pathology. Indeed,
in this study, both worry and emotion suppression were associ-
ated with significantly greater early anterior insula recruitment
than emotion acceptance, but significantly less late dACC re-
cruitment than emotion acceptance. Further, greater early acti-
vation was associated with reduced regulatory success across
all three conditions. Thus, one mechanism by which emotion
acceptance may exert ameliorating effects in the treatment of
GAD is through normalization of activation along these nodes,
an area for further research.
Increased late-phase dACC activation in the acceptance con-
dition was found in regions that directly overlap with those re-
ported in the extinction of contextual fear, and in particular the
early stages of within-session extinction (Lang et al., 2009; Etkin
et al., 2011). Although an emphasis has been placed on the role
of subgenual and rostral ACC in the modulation of amygdala ac-
tivation during extinction of cue conditioned fear in studies of
human fear conditioning (Delgado et al., 2008; Milad et al., 2007;
Phelps et al., 2004), studies examining the extinction of context-
ual fear have implicated a larger role for the dACC (Lang et al.,
2009; Sehlmeyer et al., 2011; Maier et al., 2012). Contextual condi-
tioning differs from classic cue conditioning in that the condi-
tioned cue (CS) is unpaired with the unconditioned stimulus
(US). Thus, unlike in cued conditioning where the US and CS are
predictably paired, the onset of the US is unpredictable. This un-
predictability leads to a chronic expectation of threat, and un-
certainty about when or how that threat will come. Thus,
whereas cued conditioning paradigms serve as strong analogs
to fear states, contextual fear conditioning paradigms tap more
closely into sustained anxiety states and are more aligned with
the experience of generalized anxiety (Vansteenwegen et al.,
2008). Although speculative given the small sample and only
moderate effect sizes reported here, the results of the current
study may provide some preliminary support for the overlap be-
tween emotion acceptance and extinction learning of this type
of contextual fear.
The finding of increased dACC/dmPFC activation associated
with emotion acceptance relative to worry or suppression also
aligns somewhat with findings for cognitive reappraisal, which
have shown a strong correlation between dACC activation dur-
ing reappraisal and reductions in distress ratings, indicating re-
appraisal success (Berkman and Lieberman, 2009; Buhle et al.,
2014). Existing studies of cognitive reappraisal additionally im-
plicate DLPFC, VLPFC and dmPFC activation, coupled with
decreased medial orbitofrontal and amygdala activation
(Ochsner et al., 2002; Goldin et al., 2008; Buhle et al., 2014). In this
study, regulation using emotion acceptance was associated
with significantly stronger dmPFC-amygdala and VLPFC-
amygdala functional connectivity and significantly less early
amygdala activation relative to worry with moderate effect
sizes, in line with findings related to cognitive reappraisal.
However, regulation using emotion acceptance demonstrated
significantly less recruitment of lateral PFC regions than regula-
tion with suppression or worry. A recent study directly compar-
ing emotion acceptance and cognitive reappraisal in a sample
of remitted depression patients found the largest peak activa-
tion during emotion acceptance was the dACC, consistent with
this study, and less DLPFC and frontal pole recruitment than
cognitive reappraisal (Smoski et al., 2015). This suggests less reli-
ance upon recruitment of lateral PFC regions during emotion ac-
ceptance may differentiate this strategy from cognitive
reappraisal.
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Emotion acceptance was associated with significantly less
dmPFC (BA 6,8) and insula activation relative to worry and sup-
pression and precuneus activation relative to worry, regions
supporting self-referent processing and key nodes in the default
mode network. These regions overlap with findings from exist-
ing studies of mindfulness, which have reported an overall
‘quieting’ effect of mindfulness on default mode regions associ-
ated with subjective awareness (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006;
Farb et al., 2007; Herwig et al., 2010). This suggests one mechan-
ism of acceptance may be the ‘interruption’ of self-focused, ru-
minative processing of emotionally salient information,
perhaps facilitated by increased mindfulness.
There are several limitations to consider when interpreting
these results. First, because the task in this study is asking par-
ticipants to engage attention and thought in a particular way in
the absence of objective measurement, it is impossible to know
for sure what participants were doing while responding to the
regulation instructions. Additionally, although a manipulation
check assessing participants’ perceived success at engaging
each regulation strategy was administered post-scan, we did
not assess the extent to which participants utilized the target
strategy more so than the others in each condition. However,
given the significant differences found across conditions, it is
likely the three regulation instructions led to distinctly different
responses by the participants. Second, we employed relatively
liberal statistical thresholds in our fMRI and gPPI analyses.
Given that this is the first study to our knowledge that investi-
gates the neural correlates of emotion acceptance as a regula-
tion strategy in GAD, and our focus on a priori, empirically
derived ROIs, we elected to take a less conservative approach to
thresholding and multiple comparison corrections so as to con-
trol for Type-II error, which may have resulted in an inflation of
Type-I error. As recently discussed in Eklund et al. (2016), cur-
rent methods in fMRI research raise the risk of Type-I error to a
degree which calls many fMRI results into scrutiny and ques-
tion. In this study, we took precautions to attempt to limit the
potential for erroneous errors that might have lead to Type-I
error. However, we nevertheless applied relatively liberal
thresholds to our data, in order to control for Type-II error. As
such, the results herein should be considered as hypothesis
generating, and are in need of further validation through repli-
cation. Third, we employed a block design, which inherently
introduces issues of collinearity (Mumford et al., 2015). We at-
tempted to minimize these effects through our condition ran-
domization procedure, and by comparing across conditions for
each time window rather than within conditions. However, due
to the inability to fully control for time effects on collinearity
using the current design, these results again should be inter-
preted with caution and are in need of replication. Additionally,
the sample in this study was highly educated, average to high
income, and primarily non-Hispanic Caucasian. Therefore, it is
unclear whether the results found here would generalize to in-
dividuals from other backgrounds. The current study was also
limited to female participants only, so it is unclear whether
these results would be replicated in a male sample. Finally, it is
notable that lower distress ratings following regulation with
emotion acceptance only moderately predicted self-reported
success at using emotion acceptance as a regulation strategy,
whereas distress ratings significantly predicted success at
engaging in worry or suppression. This may be related to the
novelty of emotion acceptance as a regulation skill relative to
worry or suppression. Unlike worry or suppression, which are
common maladaptive regulation strategies associated with
GAD, emotion acceptance was introduced as a new skill. Thus,
the weaker relationship between self-perceived regulation suc-
cess and levels of distress may reflect the need for more formal
training in emotion acceptance to achieve beneficial effects.
In summary, we sought to examine the mechanisms of emo-
tion acceptance as an alternate emotion regulation strategy to
worry or emotion suppression in GAD. Regulating worry in GAD
through the use of emotion acceptance successfully downregu-
lated amygdala, insula and hippocampal activation and was
associated with significantly lower recruitment of default-mode
structures and lower ratings of distress relative to worry. The
mechanisms of emotion acceptance in this study aligned most
closely with mindful awareness and extinction learning, sug-
gesting emotion acceptance may exert ameliorating effects in
GAD through exposure to distress and an increase in present
moment awareness, perhaps facilitating the updating of contin-
gencies related to distress over uncertainty or unpredictable
outcomes. Future laboratory studies are needed to more closely
examine the relationship between emotion acceptance and ex-
tinction at the neural level, in order to determine if overlapping
neural circuitry represents common or distinct mechanisms.
This study provides a clinically relevant first step towards
examining this potential mechanism. If a mechanism of emo-
tion acceptance is through extinction learning, this lends sup-
port for the use of this strategy in a broader CBT framework in
which exposure and extinction learning lie at the heart of thera-
peutic change.
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